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The current debate about Ukraine is troubling for at least three reasons.  First, Russia is being belittled and 
President Putin caricaturized in unnecessarily unhelpful ways.  Second, the comparisons between President Obama 
and Neville Chamberlain or Putin and Hitler are deeply flawed. All analogies are problematic. But if an analogy is to 
be drawn, then why not make a comparison to the prelude to the Korean War, when it was thought that Washington 
had better counter aggression in East Asia if it hoped to retain allies in Western Europe.   
Did allied resolve over Korea really keep Western Europe out of communist clutches?  Is that what kept the free 
world free?   
Questions such as these point to the third problem swirling around the Ukraine debate: some very important 
assumptions remain unquestioned. Like: what commitments does the United States have, and to whom?  Presidents 
and their representatives have made all sorts of promises and pronouncements over the years.  Yet, when is the last 
time the U.S. Senate openly debated the terms of a bilateral defense treaty?     
Constitutionally speaking, there are very constrained circumstances under which “we the people” owe other 
countries anything.  So, what obligations are pundits, politicians, and policy makers actually referring to when they 
claim the U.S. needs to act? 
Unfortunately, ‘we the people’ have paid insufficient attention to how diffuse U.S. foreign policy-making has 
become. Worse, those we rely on to advise us about national security – namely, defense intellectuals – have been 
equally derelict.  Case in point, one question we should not have to ask is how, 12+ years after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, any part of Ukraine can be absorbable by Russia.   
Just think about it.  In a 21st century replete with suicide terrorism, IEDs, “green on blue” violence, and any number 
of other hard-to-counter insurgent tactics, what would lead a country to even think it can successfully ingest a 
population that doesn’t want to be absorbed?  It is one thing to already contain such a population.  But – why would 
you willingly go out and swallow poison? 
Two answers suggest themselves. 1) Irredentism – in which case you are not swallowing poison; you are simply 
reuniting kin. For instance, instead of absorbing rabid Russophobes, Putin and his advisers are absorbing 
Russophiles – Crimeans aren’t Chechens.  Or, 2) it is not the population per se you are interested in.  Instead, you 
are after stuff, and are willing to use whatever means necessary to assert your authority, consequences be damned.  
If this is your approach, history offers three broad methods: 
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a) carrots and sticks – you reward collaborators and sub-contract coercion to them. 
b) eliminationism – you either wipe or drive out any group that opposes you. 
c) population transfers – you do more than just move people out, you move other people in. 
Of course, numerous variations on these themes can be, and have been, practiced in sequence or in combination.  
However, each of these methods and any of its variations generally requires heavy-handed social controls and works 
best when there is already a faction-ridden local history to draw on.  Although, even then, it is not clear that any 
recent aggressor has applied these techniques successfully over the mid-run. 
By way of example, consider the trouble Israel has had with the Occupied Territories or China with Tibet.  Or, for 
the biggest lesson of all, consider Afghanistan.  Rightly or wrongly, numerous Cold Warriors believe the Soviet 
Union’s demise began with its invited invasion of Afghanistan (and many Afghans concur). 
Recent and ongoing cases of insurgency and rebellion should be highly suggestive.  Say that, rather than 
Washington having encouraged members of the former Warsaw Pact to join NATO, it had encouraged them to 
make themselves more individually indigestible instead.  Then, not only could NATO have been dismantled, but its 
dissolution would have signaled a genuine (instead of just a faux) reset with Russia.1  Even better, instead of an 
unwieldy number of countries now thinking they might be able to count on unwieldy multilateralism for their 
collective defense, populations intent on securing themselves could have urged their governments to turn the 
specter of intimidation inside out.2  How so?  Again, the world is awash in hard-to-counter methods of self-defense: 
insurgency, terrorism, cyber-attacks.  The world is also awash in small arms. 
In other words, what the Swiss and Finns did prior to World War II – and what some have dubbed “punitive 
resistance” – could easily be updated.   
In fact, there are a limitless number of things countries could do to preemptively deter 21st century expansionist 
states.  For one, virtually all resistance movements and rebellions have been reactive, as the prefix re- suggests – not 
premeditated.  They have emerged in the wake of invasion.  Few ministries of defense have either worked toward, or 
advertised, their ability to stage a Red Dawn-like reception for invaders.  Nor is the potential in such an approach 
confined just to countries in the former Soviet orbit.  Any country could adopt a “don’t tread on me” or “beware: 
poison” defense, which is a type of defense well-suited to a world predicated on sovereignty.        
To illustrate, consider the insurgent spectrum found in Sudan.3 Nubans, the people famous for having been 
photographed by Leni Riefenstahl, live in a mountain zone well away from any of Sudan’s borders.  Unfortunately, 
that means that they are stuck.  They can wage an insurgency, as they have on and off for decades, but though the 
Sudanese government will probably never succeed in fully penetrating their mountain fastnesses, the Nubans 
cannot sufficiently hold their own down on flatter ground.  At best rebel elements can make life difficult and costly 
for the regime in Khartoum. But eventually both sides will have to come to some sort of live-and-let-live 
accommodation.   
Insurgents in Darfur, to the west of the Nuban Mountains, are marginally better off. They at least abut a porous 
border which affords them a relatively easy way to ferry fighters in and out. But this also makes them dependent on 
their alignments with different Chadian factions who have their own complicated politics, which means Darfuris are 
enmeshed in regional and supra-regional dynamics well beyond their control – which has been a problem. 
In contrast, rebels in what was once southern Sudan now have their own country, the Republic of South Sudan, the 
world’s newest independent state. Southern Sudanese rebels proved able to earn their independence in part thanks 
to timing – they were fighting longest, hardest, first.  But they also had distance from the capital, favorable terrain, a 
visionary leader, staunch allies, and strength in numbers going for them. The flip side to southerners’ tenacity, 
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 It seems quite ironic that a socialist form of defense is considered to be the best possible defense against former communists.  And 
that this collectivist approach is meant to defend a free market system which profits some nation-states much more than others. 
2
 Or responsible civil servants could have alerted citizens to prod their governments to a) care, and b) do something. 
3
 Caveat: there are quite a few more insurgencies and proto-insurgencies than the three singled out here. 
  
however, is that too many young men now know little else but fighting. Some observers cite this as a major 
contributing factor in the civil war that is brewing in South Sudan. Nonetheless, one (grim) silver lining to the 
presence of so many ex-combatants is that even should Khartoum stoke the violence, Omar al-Bashir’s regime 
would have to be nuts to try to re-seize the South. 
TOXICITY 
Already 70+ years ago, anthropologists were identifying groups of people around the world who (willfully or not) 
made themselves unconquerable.  Every empire has encountered people it did not even try to control.  Usually these 
have been peoples living in less-than-accessible areas.  Invariably, something in their past sent them fleeing to 
higher, swampier, or more inhospitable ground.  Worth noting is that any group that did so, no matter how weak at 
the time, did so because it wanted to remain apart.  Otherwise, it could have assimilated.4  The implication: it isn’t 
just terrain, but also values and priorities that make some peoples more resistant to ‘capture’ than others.   
Of course, anyone familiar with defensive principles knows that impregnability and the appearance of 
impregnability have a deterrent value all of their own. Thus the beauty of difficult terrain. But no matter how 
invaluable erecting walls, digging moats, donning armor, or investing in missiles might be, an even simpler way to 
put off attackers would be to advertise extreme toxicity.     
Being poisonous is different from being impenetrable. There are an endless number of ways to turn citizens into the 
nationalist equivalent of a staph infection.  
Toxicity should be attractive for a host of reasons. For one, the very process of building up a sense of national 
dignity and using nationalism for anti-access purposes would itself contribute to and then ensure that citizens 
would not want to be absorbed.5  Toxicity would also cost less than more conventional forms of deterrence.   
Not only are advanced weapons systems exorbitantly expensive, but they are exactly the things that more powerful 
(and aggressive) countries excel at countering. In contrast, there is no 20th century case I can think of in which those 
waging a guerrilla war on behalf of nationalism lost to foreigners; in fact, enter foreigners and the nationalists 
eventually prevail.6 Or, wherever nationalism is weak but other allegiances – to tribe, clan, or religious group – 
remain strong, foreigners have had an even harder time. Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq should only 
underscore this.   
In fact, over the past several decades, a panoply of new tactics, techniques, and procedures for resistance and 
opposition have emerged.  Add these to new sources of external support made possible by far-flung and increasingly 
well-connected diasporas, and it doesn’t matter how totalitarian a 21st century aggressor might want to be, no 
conqueror will be able to immediately seize or control everything.   
At the same time, if done right, advertising at least some of the bad things an invader would suffer should preclude 
anyone from even wanting to try.  Here is where information operations and strategic communications could come 
into their own.  As it is, the usual signaling via diplomacy, military exercises, the deployment of forces, and display 
of capabilities is fraught with the potential to be misread, as is all cross-cultural communication.  Instead, why not 
apply ‘shock and awe’ to ‘hearts and minds’?  Let family members of those who serve in adversaries’ militaries know 
what awaits their loved ones in graphic detail, or make clear to the population at large how much terror they can 
expect at home, where they think they are safe.  In other words, stoke fears. 
Admittedly, what exactly “if you invade, then here’s what we might do” could consist of would need to be tailored to 
who the aggressor is.  But this is a challenge that anyone who enjoys thinking unconventionally should relish.  ‘Red 
teaming’ on behalf of the homeland shouldn’t just appeal to deep-thinking defense analysts and special operators, 
but to all those who have a defiant streak and a penchant for wile. 
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 Or they could have accepted second class status, or kept migrating till they found a more welcoming area and/or empty land, etc. 
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 Unfortunately, as several international officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School have pointed out, civil defense and 
resistance are no longer prominent in any European military’s war plans. 
6
 Of course, where foreigners assist one side in a civil war, and that side acts sufficiently nationalist, then nationalists also prevail (e.g. 
the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines). 
  
I can think of one major objection to the argument that countries should be encouraged to make all parts of 
themselves toxic to conquerors. Say Strong State X isn’t interested in absorbing anyone.  Perhaps it just seeks 
territory, or water, minerals, or “stuff.” After all, going after lebensraum or loot and booty wasn’t just conceivable 
prior to the Allied victory in World War II, but was a major impetus for war.  It would be naïve to assume that the 
prospect of pillage and property won’t always motivate some men.  Just look at how war-torn Congo has been 
treated by its neighbors.   
Look, too, at how Congolese (the people) have been treated. 
One unintended consequence of the fact that we live in an era that (rightfully) condemns the wholesale enslavement 
or subjugation of other people is that once it is no longer possible to put people to use, it is easy to consider them of 
no use.7 We get ethnic cleansing as a result, which inverts irredentism. Instead of simply absorbing and assimilating 
co-ethnics and subjugating or enslaving the rest – which is what conquest used to permit – strong states ingest and 
then attempt to purge whatever extraneous population they don’t want.   
However, here is where globalization in 2014 should offer an improvement over globalization circa Bosnia.  Outright 
eliminationism in the modern era has never really been possible.  Except in the case of small, self-contained tribes 
or religious communities, wiping out everyone can’t be achieved.  Hutu genocidaires, for instance, came nowhere 
close to killing all Tutsi in 1994.  In fact, their spree ensured a Tutsi revival.  The existence of diasporas – and of 
students, laborers, refugees, and exiles who live abroad – makes it next to impossible to wipe out an ethnic or 
religious group today.  Target the communities they come from and that should raise the specter of revenge.  Surely 
more could be made of this specter than has been thus far.  Somewhere between the Israeli government’s reaction to 
the 1972 Munich Olympics, for which perpetrators were killed in their beds years later, and the ways in which Iran’s 
al Quds force operates lie myriad possibilities for promising aggressors sleepless nights and an endless reign of 
terror.   
Ironically, fears about the Evil Eye, witchcraft, and sorcery have long served a similar purpose in small-scale face-
to-face communities.  And while most Americans might consider it far-fetched to think that anyone could be 
deterred by threats of supernatural or karmic payback, the hours of air-time spent recently on the whereabouts of 
missing Malaysian Air flight 370 point to the public’s deep-seated, even existential concerns about air travel.  As the 
film, television, and marketing industries have made abundantly clear over the years, the power of suggestion is 
persuasive indeed.  
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
As for what putting missiles in Poland now does for Ukrainians, it may make Poland harder to swallow, just like 
moving armaments to the Baltic states may bulk them up a bit.  But as military officers from Eastern Europe sadly 
joke, their countries are nothing more than speed bumps should the Russians decide to reconstitute their former 
Union.  Which is why, again, the better deterrent should be to have Russians ask Russians (and the Kremlin) why 
they would even want to try to reassemble an empire?8  Don’t they remember what invading Afghanistan did to the 
Soviet Union?  Don’t they already have plenty of terrorism concerns thanks to unrest in the Caucasus?  Does the 
Kremlin really intend to do nothing about the Chinese seeping into its Far East?  Can Russia really afford so much 
over-reach?   
Meanwhile, to get enough Russians to not only reject, but fear what reassembling a Greater Russia would embroil 
them in requires Americans and others to stop insulting Russia’s capabilities or Putin’s intelligence which, to any 
Russian who cares about Russia’s (never mind Putin’s) honor and status, is a taunt. 
To be clear, too, “don’t tread on me”/”beware: poison” suits any country that has an aggressive or more militarily 
capable neighbor or adversary.  The only reason I have singled out Russia is because if we are not more careful with 
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 For a more in-depth explanation of the connection between the ‘death of conquest’ and ethnic cleansing, see Anna Simons, “The 
Death of Conquest,” The National Interest (Spring 2003) or “Making Sense of Ethnic Cleansing,“ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 22 
(1999). 
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 Of course, the eventual ideal should be that distaste for conquest is so internalized as a norm that the prospect never even crosses a 
Russian – or any – leader’s mind. 
  
our rhetoric and contradictory signaling, we may end up embroiled as well – which would be disastrous for all 
involved.  
Finally, while self-defense, ‘stand your ground’ and ‘no duty to retreat’ resonate with Americans, it is important to 
remember the U.S. has never been forced to submit to a foreign power; invasion is inconceivable to us.  Doubtless, 
that is one reason many Americans find movies like Red Dawn so appealing – resistance strikes us as fun.  
Demographically, economically, politically, historically, and geographically we remain fortunate. The 2nd 
Amendment also arms us in a profoundly important way.  Elsewhere, countries have been invaded and resistance to 
invasion would need to be crafted quite differently.  The crafting also needs to be craftily done.  The population has 
to be fully engaged.  Most importantly, the citizenry has to want to make itself indigestible.9  
In the end, I can think of four approaches to indigestibility that less advantaged countries might avail themselves of: 
1)  Be too big to be able to be swallowed – which helps explain alliances. 
2)  Make all parts of you too difficult to grab – this is the armadillo/porcupine approach to defense. 
3)  Be too toxic and advertise your toxicity – which is what every poisonous plant and animal does; 
something that seems particularly well-suited to our ‘information age.’ 
4)  Mix and match. 
While ‘mix and match’ will probably strike most as the ideal response, let me offer one final image:  rattlesnakes, 
copperheads, cobras, mambas, and adders.  We don’t ingest them, but when we invade their territory the response is 
toxic, no ‘ifs, ands, or buts.’10  Better still, their “don’t tread on me” nature not only suits sovereignty’s defense, but 
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 Here, again, diasporas can prove incredibly useful.  Governments should be prepared to use them, but must also be wary so that 
diaspora communities do not become the tail that agitates the neighboring dog. 
10
 Or, for an alternative, think anti-freeze – which, as any dog owner knows, may be oh-so-irresistible but ever so deadly. 
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